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CHAPTER 20 
Education Law 
MARILYN L. STICKLOR* 
§20.1. Introduction. During the 1974 Survey year, the attention 
of education law practitioners as well as the public was focused on the 
issue of school desegregation, which "aroused passions and engaged 
the interest of a broad cross section of citizens."1 This chapter will dis-
cuss these developments in school desegregation and other significant, 
albeit less dramatic, developments in an area of traditional concern in 
Massachusetts, state aid to nonpublic schools,2 and 1 in two areas of 
more recent concern, student rights3 and maternity leave.4 Other de-
velopments in teacher personnel administration5 and school gov-
ernance6 will be surveyed. 
§20.2. Racial balance and desegregation: The. violations and 
scope of remedies. The nine year struggle to define the require-
ments of the Racial Balance Law1 culminated during the Survey year 
in judicial and legislative activity at the state level which crossed the 
threshold from challenge to reluctant implementation of racial bal-
ance in Boston and Springfield. At the same time, judicial, and to a 
far lesser extent, legislative, activity at the federal level foretold a shift 
*MARILYN L. STICKLOR is Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Boston. 
§20.1. 1 School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2031, 
2079, 319 N.E.2d 427, 446 (addendum, Tauro, C.J.). See§§ 20.2-.4 infra. 
2 See § 20.5 infra. For prior discussions, see Levenson, Educa~ion Law, 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law§ 23.1, at 543; Education Law, 1969 Ann. Surv.: Mass. Law§ 18.1, at 
460. 
3 See§§ 20.6-.7 infra. For prior discussion, see Levenson, Education Law, 1970 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law§ 23.2, at 546; Comment, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 23.6, at 551. 
4 See § 20.9 infra. 
5 See §§ 120.8, 20.10-.11 infra. 
6 See § 20.12 infra. 
§20.2. 1 The term "Racial Balance Law" shall be used to refer to G.L. c. 15, §§ 11-1 K 
and c. 71, §§ 37C, 37D, originally inserted by Acts of 1965, c. 641, §§ 1, 2. See Roach, 
Education Law, 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law § 20.3, at 295. The term "New Racial Bal-
ance Law" shall be used to refer to the Racial Balance Law as amended by Acts of 1974, 
c. 636. 
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of the spotlight in Boston for subsequent years to the federal forums. 
The shift in activity from the state forum to the federal highlights 
the distinction between the concepts of "racial imbalance" and "seg-
regation." Activity at the state level focused on "racial imbalance," de-
fined by the Massachusetts legislature in terms of student assignment. 2 
A school is considered to be "racially imbalanced" when more than 
fifty per cent of the students in that school are non-white. 3 For the 
purpose of determining racial imbalance, classification as non-white 
may be made on the basis of appearance. 4 On the other hand, the 
federal focus was on "segregation" in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,5 defined by purpose or intent to discriminate. 6 For the 
purpose of determining whether segregated schools exist, identifiable 
races, national origins or ethnic minorities which suffer economic and 
cultural discrimination could be considered together as a single 
category. 7 
The significance of the different focuses employed by the state and 
federal forums is in the scope of the remedies available. On the state 
level, legislative remedial efforts were directed solely toward student 
assignment. The redrawing of school attendance districts was con-
strained by the need to bear a reasonable proximity to recognized 
neighborhoods and to give safety the same weight as achievement of 
racial balance.8 Moreover, insofar as the duties or remedies of the Ra-
cial Balance Law were legislatively created, they were subject to possible 
limitation or abolition by the state legislature.9 In federal court, how-
ever, once a purpose or intent to segregate is found, the remedies a-
vailable. to accomplish desegregation may be broader in scope than stu-
dent assignments10 and may include elimination of all consequences 
and vestiges of segregation. Furthermore, the remedies must be im-
plemented forthwith, and are evaluated by the standard of whether 
they are reasonable, feasible and workable.U Objections to transporta-
tion of students are valid only when the time or distance of travel is so 
great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly im-
2 G.L. c. 71, § 37D, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 958. 
3 G.L. c. 71, § 37D. Conversely, under the New Racial Balance Law, a school is "ra-
cially balanced" when more than thirty per cent but not more than fifty per cent of its 
students are non-white. 
4 See School Comm. of New Bedford v. Commissioner of Educ., 349 Mass. 410, 416, 
208 N.E.2d 814,818 (1965). 
5 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971). 
6 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
7 See id. at 197. 
8 See &hoot Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1543, 
1562-63, 287 N.E.2d 438, 452-53 (Springfield I). 
9 See § 20.3 infra. 
10 Desegregation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not require 
racial balance. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971). 
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c, 2000(c)(6); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 1656; and Pub. L. No. 93-380, 
§§ 205, 251 (Aug. 21, 1974). 
11 See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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pinge on the educational process. 12 As a practical matter, individuals 
or groups seeking legal relief from a busing plan tb promote deseg-
regation usually have been unsuccessful. 13 
§20.3. Racial balance. Following an unsuccessful challenge in 
1967 to the constitutionality of the Racial Balance L,aw by the Boston 
School Committee, 1 state court proceedings concerning the Racial 
Balance Law prior to the 1974 Survey year generaUy concerned the 
procedural format established by the Law2 and a collateral attempt to 
limit the Law's impact. 3 
In both Springfield / 4 and Boston /,5 the school committees of Spring-
field and Boston challenged the 1971 actions of the state Board of 
Education in withholding state school funds from the committees 
under the· Racial Balance Law. In holding that the withholding of 
funds by the Board was not justified, the Supreme Judicial Court 
pointed out that three conditions must be met before the sanctions 
contained in the Racial Balance Law could be invoked by the Board. 
First, the Board must find that progress within a njasonable time to-
ward implementation of an approved plan was not being made. 6 Sec-
ond, the Board had a statutory obligation to provide technical assis-
tance to a school committee in formulating a plan. 7 And, third, the 
school committee had to reject specific recommendations made by the 
Board for a plan, or, after specific recommendatioQs had been made 
by the Board, the school committee had to submit a revised plan 
12 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971). 
13 For a compendium of cases challenging busing orders, see Annot., Relief Against 
School Board's "Busing" Plan to Promote Desegregation, 50 A.L.R,3d 1089. 
§20.3. 1 School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 
(1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). 
2 For a case prior to the 1974 Survey year concerning Springfield, see School Comm. 
of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1543, 287 N.E.2d 438 (Springfield 
I). For such cases prior to the 1974 Survey year concerning Boston, see School Comm. 
of Boston v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 292 N.E.2d 338 (Boston I); 
School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 275, 292 N.E.2d 870 
(Boston II). 
3 Opinion of the Justices, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 298 N.E.24 840 (bill prohibiting 
transportation of students without parental consent and giving each child through his 
parent the absolute right to attend the school nearest his home that has an available 
seat held unconstitutional). 
4 School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 1972 Massi Adv. Sh. 1543, 287 
N.E.2d 438. , 
5 School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 292 N.E.2d 
338. 
6 Springfield I, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1556, 287 N.E.2d at 450-51; Boston I, 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 167, 292 N.E.2d at 343-44. 
7 Springfield I, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1557-58, 287 N.E.2d at 451; Boston I, 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 170, 292 N.E.2d at 345. 
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which was rejected by the Board. 8 Although the school committees of 
both Springfield and Boston were thus considered to be in literal-if 
less than enthusiastic-compliance with the Racial Balance Law, the 
Court exercised its equity power in directing the superior court to es-
tablish schedules for the filing of short-term plans for both localities. 9 
Subsequently, short-term plans were submitted by the Boston and 
Springfield school committees, 10 but were rejected following hearings 
by the Board of Education 11 as not satisfying the criteria of the Law .12 
Thus, after eight years of continuous activity and vigorous debate, the 
substantive issues involved in the Board of Education's determination 
to reject a plan developed by a local school committee and to recom-
mend a specific plan as a means of achieving racial balance were first 
properly presented to the Supreme Judicial Court on bills for judicial 
review in the 1974 Survey year. 
In Boston ///, 13 the Supreme Judicial Court considered the school 
committee's challenge to the Board plan developed as a result of ad-
ministrative hearings held by the Board of Education before a hearing 
examiner, Professor Louis Jaffe, between March and May, 1973. The 
school committee disputed the proper scope of the hearings, the 
evidentiary basis for the factual assumptions of the school committee's 
plan, and various aspects of the Board's plan. The school committee 
contended that, in accordance with the Court's order for the Board to 
develop an administrative record in Boston //,1 4 the hearings should 
have been limited to the propriety of the Board's rejection in 
November 1972 of the school committee's original plan based only on 
the evidence before it at that time, and that the Board should have es-
tablished the basis of its decision that the committee's factual determi-
nations were not supported by substantial evidence. 15 Rejecting the 
8 Springfzeld I, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1559, 287 N.E.2d at 452; Boston I, 1973 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 169, 292 N.E.2d at 344-45. In Boston II, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 275, 292 
N.E.2d 870, the Court established that the Board's determination must be based on an 
administrative record established at a hearing which would subsequently serve as the 
basis for judicial review. ld. at 277-78, 292 N.E.2d at 873. 
9 Springfield I, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1556, 287 N.E.2d at 456-57; Boston I, 1973 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 172-73, 292 N.E.2d at 347. 
10 The Springfield plan was transmitted without the approval of the School Commit-
tee. 
11 The Boston plan was initially rejected by the Board in the absence of an adminis-
trative record. In Boston II, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 277-78, 292 N.E.2d at 873, the mat-
ter was remanded to the Board of Education for hearings and the establishment of an 
administrative record. 
12 Springfield II, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 663-65, 311 N.E.2d 69, 72-73; Boston III, 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 1316, 302 N.E.2d 916,918-19. 
13 School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 302 N.E.2d 
916. 
14 School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 275, 278-81, 292 
N.E.2d 870, 873-74. 
15 Boston III, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1319, 302 N.E.2d at 920. 
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contentions of the committee, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that 
the hearings ordered in Boston II were intended as a "vehicle for ac-
tion" rather than as an explanation for past decisions. 16 The Court 
stated that a factual investigation by the Board wo~ld have served no 
purpose since the school committee's plan failed to provide for the 
redistricting necessary to alleviate racial imbalance.17 The school 
committee also had charged that the Board's own plan was defective 
in not considering safety on an equal basis with r~lieving imbalance; 
in providing for large, gerrymandered districts; in ffJ.iling to hold pub-
lic hearings before districts were changed; and in qisregarding educa-
tional concerns. 18 Applying the limited scope of review traditionally 
accorded the decisions of administrative agencies, the Court af-
firmed the Board's plans as based on substantial evidence and not ar-
bitrary, capricious, or based upon errors of law .19 
[I]t is not our function to judge the particular merits or faults of a 
plan .... If the Committee sincerely desires tlie correction of 
perceived defects its task is not one of litigation but of consulta-
tion and persuasion. 20 
The Opinion and Order of the Board of Education was affirmed, 
paving the way for implementation of the Racial Balance Law in the 
Boston public schools in September 1974_21 
In an effort to forestall the reassignment of students in accordance 
with the Racial Balance Plan, a home rule petition was addressed to 
the Massachusetts legislature by the city of Boston • providing that the 
authority of the school committee to assign students based on race, 
sex or creed without the consent of the student's parent or guardian 
be conditioned on the results of a referendum in Boston.22 In Opinion 
cf the Justices to the Lieutenant Governor, 23 the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the petition would significantly encourage and involve the 
state in racial discrimination and, if enacted, would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Articles I 
and X of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Con-
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1320, 302 N.E.2d at 920-21. 
18 Id. at 1322-26, 302 N.E.2d at 921-23. 
19 Id. 
2o Id. 
21 An order of the Board on Dec. 26, 1974 established a timetable to insure im-
plementation in September 1974. In January and March 1974, the Board filed petitions 
seeking judicial enforcement of its order. Orders requiring co~pliance with various as-
pects of the Board's order were entered by a single justice qf the Supreme Judicial 
Court in January and April 1974. 
22 Opinion of the Justices, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 548, 310 N.E.2d 348, 350. 
23 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 310 N.E.2d 348. 
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stitution. 24 The bill " 'does far more than repeal sub silentio effective 
enforcement of the racial imbalance law.' . . . Instead, by barring as-
signment of pupils on the basis of race, the bill would ensure the per-
petuation of presently existing racial imbalance in Boston's schools."25 
In Springfield Il, 26 the Supreme Judicial Court considered that 
school committee's challenge to the Board plan developed for Spring-
field following administrative hearings held by the Board of Educa-
tion before a hearing examiner in August 1973.27 As in the Boston 
proceedings, the Springfield school committee maintained that the 
Board's own plan was flawed in not meeting safety and neighborhood 
requirements, 28 and that the Board did not establish an adequate basis 
for rejection of the committee plan, did not provide technical assis-
tance to the committee, and prematurely conducted a hearing prior to 
the consideration by the committee of specific recommendations made 
by the Board for a revised plan.29 An intervenor in the administrative 
proceedings, the Quality Integrated Education Committee, challenged 
the Board plan as enforcing ethnic segregation of Puerto Rican stu-
dents in certain Springfield .schools.30 The Supreme Judicial Court re-
jected the challenges of the local school committee, and held that seg-
regative intent with regard to Puerto Rican students, necessary to es-
tablish a violation of constitutional rights, was not established by the 
record. 31 The Board's Opinion and Order was affirmed; jurisdiction 
was retained in a single justice to insure implementation by September 
1974.32 
The status of the implementation of the racial balance plans under 
the Supreme Judicial Court's orders was cast into doubt on July 26, 
1974, however, by the amendments to the Racial Balance Law ef-
fected by chapter 636 of the Acts of 1974.33 The New Racial Balance 
24 Id. at 549-50, 310 N.E.2d at 352. The effect of state encouragement of discrimina-
tion was not dependent on a finding of pre-existing segregation. See Lee v. Nyquist, 
318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd mem., 402 U.S. 935 (1971). 
25 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 548-49, 310 N.E.2d at 351. The Court found the home rule 
petition to be "virtually indistinguishable" from a bill held unconstitutional in the previ-
ous year which purported to bar the transportation without parental consent of school-
children to or from any public school. See note 3 supra. 
26 School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 311 
N.E.2d 69. 
27 The Board had approved, with slight modifications, the state Task Force on Racial 
Imbalance plan recommended by the hearing examiner. Id. at 660, 311 N.E.2d at 
72-73. 
28 Id. at 661-62,311 N.E.2d at 73-74. 
29 Id. at 664-67, 311 N.E.2d at 75-77. 
30 Id. at 669-70, 311 N.E.2d at 77-78. 
31 Id. at 675, 311 N.E.2d at 81. 
32 ld. 
33 On April 29, 1974, the General Court had passed a bill, vetoed by the Governor, 
repealing the Racial Balance Law. 
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Law required submission of a plan by a local school :committee only if 
a request for a transfer of a non-white student at a racially imbalanced 
school to a racially isolated schooP4 or of a white student at a racially 
isolated school to a racially imbalanced school was submitted to a 
school committee and could not be satisfied.35 Most significantly, if 
the Board of Education were unable to approve a plan submitted by a 
local school committee, the Board was empowered to devise a plan 
but was restricted to specific methods for alleviating racial imbalance: 
additions to existing school buildings, use of leased or portable 
facilities, and changes in use of school buildings. 36 
Alleging that chapter 636 had eliminated the legal basis for the 
Board's order affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Springfield 
II, the school committee of Springfield moved to vacate the final de-
cree of the Court requiring implementation of racial balance in Sep-
tember 197 4. 3 7 The Board of Education, representeid by the office of 
the Attorney General, joined the school committee in its support of 
vacating the court orders; the motion to vacate w:(ls opposed by an 
intervening group of children and parents. Involved in the motion to 
vacate were the questions of whether chapter 636 of the Acts of 1974 
was to be afforded retrospective application and,l if so construed, 
whether chapter 636 would perpetuate segregation in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. With the opening of schqols imminent, an 
order without an accompanying opinion was entere~ by the Supreme 
Judicial Court on August 22, 1974, denying the school committee's 
motion to vacate, and reaffirming the Court's orders that a racial bal-
ance plan be implemented in Springfield in September 1974.38 
§20.4. Desegregation. A complaint filed in 1972 by black chil-
34 A racially isolated school was defined as not having more, than thirty per cent 
non-white pupils. G.L. c. 71, § 37D, as amended by Acts of 1974, f:. 636, § 5. 
35 G.L. c. 71, § 37D, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 636, § 5. 
36 G.L. c. 15, § ll, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 636, § l. ' 
37 Implementation of the Racial Balance plan in Boston subseqttient to June 21, 1974, 
was incorporated in the Interlocutory Order of the United St~tes District Court in 
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974). See§ 20.r4 infra. 
38 The reasons underlying the order were stated subsequent to! the 1974 Survey year 
in School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 1974 Mas~. Adv. Sh. 2031, 319 
N.E.2d 427 (Springfield Ill) (holding that c. 636 of the Acts of 1!974 would be uncon-
stitutional if interpreted to impede achievement of racial balance in a city subject to a 
court order that a racial balance plan be implemented). The Stjpreme Judicial Court 
noted that "[I]n spite of the sharply divergent views ... the respopsible and cooperative 
efforts of all parties have resulted in an orderly and successful ijnplementation of this 
court's order in the Springfield public schools." Id. at 2032 n.3, 3i9 N.E.2d at 429 n.3. 
The Supreme Judicial Court did not address the question if thel amendments effected 
by chapter 636 of the Acts of 1974 involved the state in racial 4iscrimination with re-
gard to localities not subject to existing court orders to implem~nt a plan under the 
provisions of the Racial Balance Law prior to the 1974 amendmeiitts. See id. at 2055-57, 
319 N.E.2d at 438. 
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dren attending Boston public schools1 and their parents alleging that 
black students were denied both equal protection of the laws and 
equality of educational opportunities2 culminated on June 21, 197 4 in 
the decision of the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts in Morgan v. Hennigan. 3 
The proceedings in Morgan examined six principal areas of opera-
tion within the Boston public schools: ( 1) facilities utilization and new 
structures, (2) districting and redistricting, (3) feeder patterns, (4) 
open enrollment and controlled transfer, (5) faculty and staff, and (6) 
vocational and examination schools. 4 The thrust of the Boston School 
Committee's position was that neighborhood schools were not uncon-
stitutional even though they contained, as a result of residential seg-
regation, racially imbalanced student bodies,5 and that racially moti-
vated discriminatory intent could not be presumed as in the case of a 
school system which originally had been a dual system compelled by 
state law. Rejecting the defense of a neighborhood school policy as 
"mere assertions,"6 the court found the school committee7 to have 
manipulated the neighborhood school concept with the intent of per-
petuating racial discrimination. 8 
§20.4. 1 The city of Springfield had been the subject of a suit instituted in 1964 which 
was dismissed without prejudice to institute a new action in the event of change in cir-
cumstance. Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (lst Cir. 1965). 
2 Violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and of 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1981, 1983 and 2000d were alleged. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 415 (D. 
Mass. 1974). 
3 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) (Garrity, j.), Morgan was affirmed subsequent to 
the 1974 Survey year sub. nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (lst Cir. 1974). 
4 379 F. Supp. at 425-69. 
5 Id. at 469-70. 
6 Id. at 474, citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 212 
(1973). 
7 The Massachusetts Board of Education, also named as a defendant in the proceed-
ings, was found free of liability for racial segregation in the Boston schools, but was re-
tained as party defendant for the purposes of remedy. 379 F. Supp. at 477. 
8 In a federal administrative compliance proceeding initiated by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l, discrimination had 
been found to exist in the Boston public schools (excluding the East Boston and Charles-
town schools as geographically distinct), except for its bilingual education program, 
in March 1973. In April 1974, the HEW reviewing authority filed a Final Decision, af-
firming all material aspects of the Initial Decision, but remanding the matter to the 
administrative law judge for further findings as to the relationship between the use of 
federal funds and the particular educational programs found to be discriminatory. In 
re Boston Public Schools, April 19, 1974. See Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 
F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1969). After further hearings, the administrative law judge on July 
25, 1974 found that federal programs were administered in a discriminatory manner. 
Subsequent to the 1974 Survey year, the administrative proceedings were dismissed 
on November 19, 1974 by the HEW Reviewing Authority as a result of compliance by 
the Boston School Committee with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and with 45 
C.F.R. 80. 
8
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Apart from the question of the sufficiency of evidence to support 
the court's findings, the opinion imposing liability in Morgan raises 
questions primarily of the separability of the district !and of the appli-
cation of the burden-shifting principle enunciated ~n Keyes v. School 
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. 9 Keyes permitted a school district to prove that 
part of the district may be geographically separate, identifiable and 
unrelated to the rest of the system} 0 The court in Morgan noted 
Charlestown and East Boston, in particular, to be fairly intact com-
munities separated from the rest of Boston by an injner harbor,t 1 but 
found that the schools of Charlestown and East Boston had not been 
operated as a distinct subsystem within the public schools. 12 Although 
the schools had not been labelled or considered as a subsystem, geo-
graphic isolation makes it unlikely that a truly neutral basis of student 
assignment would have resulted in student assigq.ment within the 
Charlestown and East Boston schools reflecting the 2 white to 1 black 
racial composition applicable to the city as a wholeP 3 Thus, applica-
tion of city-wide remedial guidelines without modification would ap-
pear to go beyond a design "to restore the victims of discriminatory 
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of 
such conduct."14 
Keyes further established that a finding of intentionally discrimina-
tory school board action in a meaningful portion of 1the school system 
shifted to the school system the burden of proving that other segre-
gated schools within the system were not also the results of intention-
ally segregative actions. 15 Having found the exam.nation and voca-
tional school programs to be segregated, the court in Morgan applied 
the burden-shifting principle to conclude that the !school committee 
had acted with segregative intent with regard to such schools. 16 Al-
though the Keyes presumption was developed in the context of geo-
graphically separate portions of a school system rather than in the 
context of programmatically separate portions, the, extension of the 
presumption-and of a remedy-to an upper-gra~e programmatic 
component would appear appropriate since the prOgrammatic com-
9 413 u.s. 189 (1973). 
10 Id. at 203. 
11 379 F. Supp. at 474. 
12 Id. at 475-76. Compare Initial Decision of the Administrativ1 Law Judge, March 2, 
1973, at 14, discussed at note 8 supra. 
13 See 379 F. Supp. at 483. 
14 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). The uncertain dynamics of the in-
terrelationship between racial composition of neighborhoods and schools, however, 
makes it difficult to posit school composition based on existent data of neighborhood 
development. See 379 F. Supp. at 470-71. 
15 413 U.S. at 208. 
16 379 F. Supp. at 481. In this respect, the First Circuit went beyond the district court 
in finding strong evidence that segregation of examination schools, trade schools, and 
vocational programs was intentional. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 593-95 (1st 
Cir. 1974). 
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ponent would reflect the segregative effect of the feeder grades. 
The opinion in Morgan concerned only the issue of liability and left 
the formulation of a desegregation plan to future proceedings. 17 The 
possibility that such plan would include a metropolitan-wide multi-
district remedy, as suggested by the school committee in the initial 
stages of the proceedings, 18 was virtually foreclosed shortly after is-
suance of the Morgan opinion, however, by the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley. 19 
Milliken considered the authority of a federal court to order the 
submission of a desegregation plan for a three-county metropolitan 
area in regard to a claim of segregation in Detroit public schools. The 
district court in Milliken had based a finding of unconstitutional dis-
crimination on a pattern of official action by Detroit school officials, 
independent action by state officials, and vicarious liability of the state 
officers for actions of the Detroit board. 20 In reversing the order for 
submission of an inter-district plan, the Court held that multi-district 
remedies could not be required absent proof that discriminatory acts 
of one or more school districts or of state officials21 substantially 
caused inter-district segregation.22 The Court's holding may be read 
to affirm the suggestion of Keyes 23 that only de jure segregation jus-
tifies relief. Only if de jure segregation is found will the court proceed 
to the inquiry into whether the schools in the system are to be de-
segregated root and branch and whether racially identifiable schools 
17 The racial balance plan, which had been developed under the Racial Balance Law, 
prior to the amendments effected by chapter 636 of the Acts of 1974, and had been af-
firmed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston III, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 302 
N.E.2d 916, was adopted by the court as a short-term remedy for violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 379 F. Supp. at 484. Compare§ 
20.2 at note 10 supra. A desegregation plan to be issued pursuant to the remedy phase 
of Morgan will supercede implementation of the racial balance plan. It is possible, how-
ever, that several Boston schools may remain or become majority non-white-and 
hence racially imbalanced-subsequent to implementation of a desegregation plan. See 
generally § 20.2 supra. Compare Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) 
(57% black, 43% white); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (66% black, 
34% white); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 n.5 (1972) 
(77% black, 22% white). 
18 The court denied a motion of the school committee to join numerous cities and 
towns around Boston as defendants, partly on the ground that the suburban mu-
nicipalities had not been charged by the plaintiffs with violation of their constitutional 
rights. 379 F. Supp. at 416. 
19 418 u.s. 717 (1974). 
20 Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587-89, 593-94 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
21 Action by state officials, either through vicarious liability or direct action, was 
not sufficiently shown to have had a cross-district segregative effect. Therefore, any re-
lief against the state officials was limited to the school district affected by segregation. 
418 U.S. at 744-45. 
22 Id. 
23 413 U.S. 189 (1973). But see id. at 214 n.18. 
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are otherwise justified. 24 
Although Milliken, therefore, clearly limits the availability of multi-
district relief, the decision left open the possibility t}1.at a multi-district 
remedy would be proper where: (1) wrongful acts pf the state or of 
each school district caused inter-district segregation, f5 or (2) wrongful 
acts of the state or of each school district causf!d segregation in 
another district,26 and where the school districts were allowed to be 
heard on the issues of multi-district liability and rem~dy. 
Even had the Court in Milliken affirmed the pr~priety of a multi-
district remedy for Detroit,27 factual differences be~ween Detroit and 
Boston would have made doubtful the imposition of a metropolitan 
remedy in Morgan. First, Detroit was 63.6% black ! and 34.8% white 
while the black population of the Boston schools h~ers around 35%. 
Therefore, the concern that a desegregated Detroit school system 
would remain identifiably black is not transferable tp Boston. Second, 
state officials in Detroit were found to have contr~buted to segrega-
tion, while the court in Morgan found the state def¢ndants to be free 
of liability.28 Similarly, the authority of Michigan ~tate officials over 
local school boards warranting the imposition of vic~rious liability ap-
pears to be greater than the authority of the Mass~chusetts Board of 
Education over local school committees. 29 
The criteria imposed in Milliken, however, will f4rther present dif-
ficulties to parties seeking a multi-district school s~stem in Boston. 30 
24 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.11, 26 (1971). 
25 418 U.S. at 745. See, e.g., Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., <J29 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 
1969); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 197p), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972). 
26 418 U.S. at 745. 
27 Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent, argued that de facto segregation in met-
ropolitan areas justifies a metropolitan remedy. 418 U.S. at t61-62. Justice White, 
joined in dissent by Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan, fmtnd, inter alia, the acts 
of the state sufficient to cause interdistrict segregation. Id. at 763j 
28 379 F. Supp. at 476-77. Morgan did not consider any possiti>Ie constitutional viola-
tion on the part of the state with regard to municipalities not sutl>ject to court orders to 
implement racial balance plans arising out of enervation of the 1Racial Balance Law by 
chapter 636 of the Acts of 1974. In the event that such amend~nt may be found un-
constitutional, however, the remedy would most likely be limite to restoration of the 
ri~ht (the Racial Balance Law) as existent before the violation (th amendment). 
9 Compare 418 U.S. at 726 n.5 with 379 F. Supp. at 322. See Bradley v. School Bd., 
462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Co rt, 412 U.S. 92 (1973) 
(lack of state control over Virginia local board). ! 
3° From the perspective of social policy, much of the sup~· rt for a multi-district 
school system has derived from the desirability of alleviating the 1scal overburden inner 
cities face which result from greater costs of municipal service . See 418 U.S. at 760 
n.12 (Douglas, J., dissenting). A multi-district school system 'tould have this effect, 
however, only if the core city were relieved of financial respons~bility for tuition of its 
population assigned as students to suburban schools. Compare 1 G.L. c. 76, § 12 with 
G.L. c. 76, § 12A (METCO). . 
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The drawing or redrawing of school district lines or the transfer of 
school units between districts to maintain separation of races31 has not 
occurred in metropolitan Boston. Proof of purposeful, racially dis-
criminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, which may make re-
structuring of district lines appropriate,32 will similarly be difficult to 
show. Although the Boston inner city and suburban areas may be 
shown to be de facto segregated,33 discriminatory use of state housing 
or zoning laws on racial rather than economic grounds must be 
demonstrated. 34 
In legislative action, the Congress affirmed the policy of the United 
States to provide equal educational opportunity while specifying ap-
propriate remedies for elimination of a dual school system in the 
Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974.35 The Act's essential fea-
tures specify that a federal court or administrative agency shall im-
pose the least restrictive measures, in the context of preserving neigh-
borhood schools, necessary to remedy denial of equal educational op-
portunity or equal protection of the laws. 36 The Act further states that 
the power of a federal court or administrative agency shall not be 
used for the purpose of achieving a balance among students with re-
gard to race, sex, religion or socio-economic status.37 
Although the Act was perceived popularly-and was presented to 
constituents by Congressmen-as raising the issue of the scope of 
constitutionally permissible limitations on the power of the federal dis-
trict courts, 38 the Act explicitly provides that it is "not intended to 
modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to 
enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States."39 
Similarly, although the Act was greeted as an "anti-busing amend-
ment," it does not present a potential bar to implementation of a bus-
ing plan ordered by a federal court as a remedy to a finding of de 
jure segregation. The prohibitions against assignment or transporta-
31 See 418 U.S. at 753-57 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
32 Id. 
33 See Route 128, Report of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
1974. 
34 Experience with the Anti-Snob Zoning Law has evidenced lack of acceptance by the 
suburbs even where proposed low-income units were to be occupied by low-income 
whites. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (discrimination on economic basis 
not invidious). 
35 Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 201-59 (Aug. 21, 1974). 
36 ld. §§ 214, 256. 
37 Id. §§ 251-53. 
38 See generally the dialogue on the power of Congress to curtail the courts in H. 
Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 319-40 (1953). See 
also Medley v. School Bd., 350 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Va. 1972), remanded on other 
grounds, 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973). 
39 Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 203(b) (Aug. 21, 1974). 
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tion of students prohibit only assignment for the purpose of over-
coming racial imbalance, which was prohibited pri<J'r to the Act both 
by operation of constitutional law and by statute. 40 i 
§20.5. State aid to nonpublic school pupil* Textbook loan 
law. In contrast to the numerous publicized but unsuccessful at-
tempts of the General Court in past years to enact legislation provid-
ing financial relief to parochial schools, 1 a textbook loan measure was 
enacted unheralded in the final days of the 1973 ~egislative session. 2 
Section 48 of chapter 71 of the General Laws wa$ amended3 to re-
quire that a school committee, upon the individual !request of a pupil 
in a private school approved under chapter 76, section 1 of the Gen-
eral Laws, lend to the pupil free of charge the same textbooks as are 
used in the public school. 4 
The Massachusetts textbook loan statute appearst! to conform to the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Fi st Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.5 In its struggle to chart a course be-
tween those two clauses in 3:. manner "productive of a benevolent 
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without spon-
sorship and without interference,"6 the United Sta~es Supreme Court 
has articulated a three-part test governing challenges to a statute as 
violative of the First Amendment. First, the statute I must have a secu-
lar legislative purpose; 7 second, its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 8 third, the statute 
must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 9 In a trilogy 
of cases decided during 1973,10 the United States ~upreme Court ap-
plied this three-part test to invalidate reimbursement of costs to pri-
40 See § 20.2 at note 10 supra. 20 U.S.C. § 1653, a precursor to Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 
253, was held not to require a stay of school desegregation orders requiring busing en-
tered to accomplish desegregation of a school system and not fot the purpose of achiev-
ing a racial balance. Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (197i2); NAACP v. Lansing 
Bd. of Education., 485 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1973). 
§20.5. 1 See Levenson, Education Law, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 23.1, at 543; 
Education Law, 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 18.1, at 460. 
2 Acts of 1973, c. 1196, amending G.L. c. 71, § 48. 
3 G.L. c. 71, § 48, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1196. 
4 Companion legislation provided for physical examinations bj a school committee or 
municipal board of health of a private school pupil at the indivi4ual request of a parent 
or guardian. Acts of 1973, c. 1197, amending G.L. c. 71, §57. 
5 The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. 
Const. amend. I. 
6 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
7 Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
8 Id. 
9 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). 
10 Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Committee for Pub. 
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). 
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vate schools, rather than to students, 11 and to invalidate benefits pro-
vided to private school students as a delineated class, rather than ben-
efits provided in common to all students. 12 The Religion Clauses 
have permitted, however, state extension of secular benefits to all 
children without regard to their religious affiliation, despite- the fact 
that indirect or incidental benefit may flow to sectarian schools.13 Re-
lying on the "child benefit" theory, the Supreme Court in Board of 
Education v. Allen14 held that a textbook loan program similar in all 
material aspects to the recently enacted Massachusetts statute did not 
violate the First Amendment. 15 
11 Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (New York law provided 
for reimbursement of nonpublic schools for expenses of services for examination and 
inspection in connection with administration, grading and compiling and reporting the 
results of tests and examinations and the maintenance of certain records); Committee 
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York fmancial aid programs for 
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools provided for direct money grants to be 
used for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment, established a tuition reim-
bursement plan for parents of children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary 
schools, and entitled taxpayer-parents to a deduction for each child attending nonpublic 
school). See also Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 
1973); aff'd,'417 U.S. 961 (1974) (New Jersey law provided for aid to parents of non-
public school students as reimbursement for the cost of secular, nonideological text-
books, instructional materials and supplies and aid to nonpublic schools to acquire secu-
lar supplies, equipment and auxiliary services). 
11 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 
U.S. 825 (1973) (Pennsylvania law provided for reimbursement of tuition paid by par-
ents of children attending nonpublic schools). 
13 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1 (1947). Cf. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1970). Although 
the decisions in both Everson and Allen predated the Supreme Court's articulation in 
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), of the entanglement criterion, exten-
sion of secular benefits to all children has been considered in dicta subsequent to Wah: 
to be in conformity with the entanglement test. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 
(1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
14 392 u.s. 236 (1968). 
15 The New York statute at issue in Allen provided that local school boards were re-
quired to purchase secular textbooks designated for use in the schools under their 
charge and lend them upon individual request "to all children residing in such district 
who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies 
with the compulsory education law." Id. at 239-40 n.3. 
Allen was specifically reaffirmed in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). In 
Norwood, the Court held, pursuant to the stringent standard for determining what con-
stitutes state aid to a school in the context of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, that textbooks, a basic educational tool, are not legally distinguish-
able from tuition grants, and are to be distinguished from generalized services govern-
ment might provide to schools in common with others. Noting that the transcendent 
value of free religious exercise in our constitutional scheme leaves room for "play in the 
joints" which is not applicable to racial discrimination, the Court in Norwood specifically 
reaffirmed Allen. Id. at 468-70. Pursuant to Norwood, pupils enrolled in private schools 
which discriminate on the basis of race would not be entitled to the textbook loan ben-
efits of chapter 1196. 
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The Massachusetts statute16 raises an issue of Firslt Amendment di-
mensions only with regard to its potential ambiguity in defining the 
benefited population as "a pupil in a private schoql which has been 
approved under [G.L. c. 76, § 1]."17 Under Massachjusetts law, there-
sponsibility for the education of a child rests with the town in which 
the child resides. 18 Application of the benefits of the textbook loan 
law to nonresident pupils attending private schools within a school 
district would be of doubtful constitutionality under! the First Amend-
ment since it would single out a specified class of citizens for special 
economic benefit which would not be available to nonresident pupils 
attending public schools. 19 ; 
However, the textbook loan law presents a more' difficult question 
of conformity to Article XLVI of the Amendments to the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth.20 Article XLVI provides that all municipal and 
state moneys for support of public schools "shall lie applied to, and 
expended in, no other schools than those which are tonducted accord-
ing to law, under the order and superintendence" of appropriate 
municipal officials, and that "no grant, appropriation or use of public 
money or property ... shall be made or authorizeq by the common-
wealth ... for the purpose of ... aiding any school ... wherein any 
denominational doctrine is inculcated .... "21 The Supreme Judicial 
Court has stated that the limitation on state aid iJfl Article XL VI is 
"emphatic and comprehensive" and "much more specific than that of 
the First Amendment."22 ' 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court has construed Article XLVI 
in advisory opinions in conjunction with specific broposed bills re-
garding nonpublic education assistance,23 the Courtlhas not had occa-
sion to discuss Article XL VI in conjunction with the "child benefit" 
16 Acts of I973, c. II96, amending G.L. c. 7I, § 48. 
17 Id. 
18 G.L. c. 76, §§ I, 5, I2. 
19 Compare G.L. c. 76, § I2. See Sloan v. Lemon, 4I3 U.S. 825 (I973); Klinger v. 
Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d I, 305 N.E.2d I29 (I973). : 
20 Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVI, § 2. 1 
21 Id. 
22 Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 836, 84I-42 (1970). Constitutions of several 
states contain prohibitions against state aid to religion more stri1gent than those of the 
First Amendment. Furnishing textbooks to parochial school stu ents has been held to 
be a forbidden use of state funds under the constitutions of everal of these states. 
Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., I92 Neb. 380, 220 N.W.2d 550 (I974); Paster v. Tus-
sey, 5I2 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. I974); Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533 
(I96I), cert. denied, 37I U.S. 823 (I962). But see Borden v. ~ouisiana State Bd. of 
Educ., I68 La. I005, I23 So. 655 (1929); Chance v. Mississippi S~ate Textbook Rating & 
Purchasing Bd., I90 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (l94I ). 
23 Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 836 (I970); Opinion of the Justices, 357 Mass. 
846 (I970); Opinion of the Justices, 354 Mass. 779 (I968). 
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theory. 24 In Quinn v. School Committee of Plymouth 25 the Court declined 
to review the issue raised by the School Committee-the constitution-
ality of school transportation for private school students-on the 
ground that no personal or property right of the Committee was 
involved.26 In the enactment of the textbook loan law, the General 
Court departed from its prior practice regarding proposed bills af-
fording nonpublic education assistance27 and did not submit the 
proposed bill to the justices for an advisory opinion.28 The precise ex-
tent to which the prohibitions of Article XLVI may be more com-
prehensive than those of the First Amendment, particularly with re-
gard to aid to parochial school students involving a basic educational 
tool, therefore remains defined-or more correctly, remains 
undefined-by the presumption of constitutionality. 
As long as the benefits of the textbook loan law are not applied to 
nonresident pupils attending private school within a school district, 
the statute should withstand constitutional scrutiny. Its neutrality in 
relation to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment seems clear 
under the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Allen.29 It 
is not clear, however, whether the textbook loan law, if subjected to 
scrutiny under the prohibitions of Article XLVI of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, would be construed as falling without such prohibitions. 
§20.6. Student rights: Rights and responsibilities of public 
school students. Since the recognition by the United States Supreme 
Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District1 of 
the right of public school students to freedom of expression, lower 
federal and state courts have attempted to strike a balance between 
requirements of school discipline and student rights. 2 Post-Tinker cases 
24 Prior opinions of Attorneys General have upheld benefits to parochial school stu-
dents on the "child benefit" theory. Op. of the Att'y Gen. (June 13, 1966) (to Hon. 
Owen B. Kiernan; guidance counselor service); Op. of the Att'y Gen. (March 26, 1951) 
(to Hon. John J. Desmond, Jr.; lunch); Op. of the Att'y Gen. (Feb. 17, 1936) (to Hon. 
Charles G. Miles; transportation). But see note 22 supra. 
25 332 Mass. 410, 125 N.E.2d 410 (1955). 
26 Id. at 413, 125 N.E.2d at 413. The Court has subsequently relaxed the require-
ments of standing of a school committee to raise constitutional issues in declaratory 
proceedings involving questions of public importance where a vista of avoidable litiga-
tion is disclosed and the issues are fully argued. School Comm. of Boston v. Board of 
Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967). 
27 See note 23 supra. 
28 The Attorney General similarly was not requested by state officers to issue an opin-
ion with regard to the conformity of the textbook loan law to Article XL VI. 
29 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
§20.6. 1 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
2 For cases originating in Massachusetts, see Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 
(l st Cir. 1971) (Quincy school committee regulation that prohibited use of school 
facilities for advertising or promoting interests of any community or nonschool agency 
or organization without committee approval was vague and overbroad as applied to 
16
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have generally assumed the interest in attending a public school to be 
a liberty or property right, and have extended sttfdent rights under 
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States.3 
The rules of law which have been developing ih the lower courts 
were addressed by the General Court in chapter p70 of the Acts of 
1974.4 The Act, which covers actual and symbolic; expression,5 dress 
codes, 6 and marriage, pregnancy and parenthood, 7 confirms in es-
sence that constitutional rights of students may be limited only if 
there is an independent education-related reason fqr the limitation. 
The significance of chapter 670 will undoubtedly lie in its bringing 
to the attention of public school officials the prin~iples applicable to 
student rights which were less easily perceived th~ough the develop-
ment of case law. The Act also may be procedurally significant in 
providing special notice and hearing requirements with regard to 
promulgation of rules and regulations concerning :student rights and 
responsibilities. 8 • 
Chapter 670 contains a proviso that the applicability of the Act is 
First Amendment activities of students who sought to distribut~· materials of a political 
nature); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (su pension of high school 
student for refusal to have his hair cut violated student's Fourt enth Amendment right 
to personal liberty); Bishop v. Cermenaro, 355 F. Supp. 1269 i (D. Mass. 1973) (voca-
tional school hair code held constitutional); Ordway v. Hargra~es, 323 F. Supp. 1155 
(D. Mass. 1971 )(rule requiring pregnant, unmarried high schoql senior to stop attend-
ing regular classes unconstitutionally limited her right to receiv~ a public school educa-
tion which is a basic personal right or liberty); Hasson v. Boot~by, 318 F. Supp. 1183 
(D. Mass. 1970) (students' rights under Due Process Clause were not violated by imposi-
tion of a one-year probation, subject to review, for the offe se of being on school 
premises with beer on their breaths, even though no prior published rule forbade 
such conduct). j 
3 For a compendium of post-Tinker cases, see Note, Constit:tional Rights of High 
School Students, 23 Drake L. Rev. 403 (1974). The Supreme C urt recently elaborated 
upon the issue of student rights. Goss v. Lopez,-U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (state is 
constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to "- public education as a 
property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clausernd which may not be 
taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum rocedures required by 
that clause); Wood v. Strickland, -U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975 (holding that a school 
board member is not immune from liability for damages undel[ the Civil Rights Act if 
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he tobk within the sphere of 
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of th~ student affected, or if 
he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional 
rights or other injury to the student). I 
4 Acts of 1974, c. 670, adding G.L. c. 71, §§ 82-86. ' 
'G.L.c.71,§82. I 
6 ld. § 83. ! 
7 Id. § 84. i 
• G.L. c. 71, § 85 requires notice to public school students of flroposed rules and reg-
ulations and a public hearing at which students' views may be p~esented and taken into 
consideration by school officials. 
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dependent upon local acceptance.9 Although local acceptance will per-
tain to the procedural restrictions imposed, the proviso should not be 
construed by public school officials to subject the constitutional rights 
of students to local determination. 1 0 
§20.7. Student rights: Student records. The right of parents and 
adult students to inspect records was established by the legislative ac-
tion of both the General Court of Massachusetts and the United States 
Congress during the Survey year. Chapter 785 of the Acts of 1973 
added chapter 71, section 34E of the General Laws, which provides 
for inspection of "academic, scholastic, or any other records concern-
ing such pupil which are kept or are required to be kept."1 The U-
nited States Congress enacted the Family Educational Rights and Pri-
vacy Act of 1974,2 which provides that no federal funds will be avail-
able to any educational institution that denies parents or an adult stu-
dent the right to inspect and to challenge the contents of student 
records. 3 
A difficulty in implementing the state law may be the interpretation 
of the scope of records which are kept but are not required to be 
kept. Further, unlike section 7 of chapter 4 of the General Laws4 (the 
so-called Freedom of Information Act), neither the state nor federal 
statute contains any exemption for material, as references, which may 
have been inserted in a record under an assumption of confidential-
ity. 
§20.8. Teacher personnel administration: Certification. The re-
quirements for certification of teachers and other professional school 
employees under General Laws chapter 71, section 38G were 
amended in the Survey year. 1 Prior to the amendment of section 38G, 
eligibility for certification by a board of education was dependent 
upon requirements regarding citizenship, health, moral character, 
courses of study and semester hours. The 1973 amendment to section 
38G establishes a two-tier system under which a provisional certificate 
will be issued, based on requirements similar to those previously ap-
9 "The provisions of [§§ 82-85] shall apply only to cities and towns which accept the 
same." G.L. c. 71, § 86. 
10 See Wood v. Strickland, -U.S.-, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975). 
§20.7. 1 Acts of 1973, c. 785, adding G.L. c. 71, § 34E. 
2 Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title V, § 513(a), 88 Stat. 571, adding 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g (Supp. 1975). 
3 Id. 
4 G.L. c. 4, § 7, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1050. 
§20.8. 1 G.L. c. 71, § 38G, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 847. This section was 
further amended by Acts of 1974, c. 814, to clarify that individuals applying for certifi-
cation within one year from the promulgation of rules and regulations under the Act 
shall be granted certification based on standards in effect prior to the effective date of 
the Act. 
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plicable to certification, for a two-year period. Permanent certification, 
available only to provisionally certified individuals who serve for a 
two-year period under the auspices of a school comrp.ittee, will be de-
pendent upon evaluation by a specially-constituted! committee as to 
professional growth and performance. The "waiver"! provision of sec-
tion 38G as in effect prior to amendment, which permits a school 
committee to be exempt in any one school year from employing cer-
tified personnel only when compliance would in the opinion of the 
board constitute a great hardship in securing teachets for the schools 
of a town, was retained. 2 , 
The significance of certification in the attainment of tenure was 
stressed in Luz v. School Committee of Lowell. 3 In construing the teacher 
tenure provisions,4 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a noncer-
tified teacher hired under the "waiver" procedure o~ section 38G who 
did not thereafter achieve certification had never b~en lawfully em-
ployed as a teacher since he was never certified andl thus was not on 
tenure and had no right to the procedural benefits of the teacher dis-
charge statute. 5 Section 38G as amended goes beyond the holding in 
Luz and provides that service of an employee to whom a waiver ap-
plies shall not be counted in acquiring tenure. 6 Howtver, the question 
still to be resolved is whether an individual hired 1Jnder the waiver 
procedure under section 38G as in effect prior to !amendment who 
thereafter achieved certification may count the noncertified portion of 
service in acquiring tenure. The Court's holding in Luz portends a 
negative answer since the Court equated noncertified service with not 
being lawfully employed as a teacher. : 
§20.9. Teacher personnel administration: Mat~rnity leave. Al-
though the issues concerning pregnancy-related dlsabilities are not 
peculiar to the field of education, a preponderance of maternity leave 
litigation has arisen regarding benefits and grounds for dismissal of 
public school teachers. 1 During the Survey year, the I Supreme Judicial 
Court considered the constitutionality of Malden's! school employee 
2 Acts of 1973, c. 847, amending G.L. c. 71, § 38G. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1217, 313 N.E.2d 925. 
4 G.L. c. 71, § 41. The teacher tenure statute provides, in ~rtinent part: "Every 
school committee, in electing a teacher who has served in its publi schools for the three 
previous consecutive school years, shall employ him to serve at it discretion, except as 
provided in [§38G] .... " G.L. c. 71, § 41. 
5 G.L. c. 71, § 42. The teacher was first employed under a special act regulating the 
employment of teachers and the school committee allowed the teacher to continue 
teaching under the "waiver" procedure to allow him time to meet certificate standards. 
1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1217, 313 N.E.2d at 925. 
6 G.L. c. 71, § 38, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1050. 
§20.9. 1 See the companion cases of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur and Cohen v. 
Chesterfield County School Bd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974) and cases cited therein. Id. at 638 
n.8. 
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maternity leave regulations in Black v. School Committee cif Malden. 2 The 
decision in Black came between two related decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, Cleveland Board cif Education v. LaFleur3 and 
Geduldig v. Aiello.4 
In LaFleur, mandatory maternity leave rules were challenged by 
pregnant public school teachers. The Supreme Court invalidated, as 
unwarranted irrebuttable presumptions violative of due process,5 two 
mandatory leave rules requiring termination of employment at arbi-
trary points during pregnancy6 and a rule imposing a three-month 
waiting period after birth prior to return to work. 7 In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Powell disagreed with the Court's application of the 
"irrebuttable presumption" doctrine, finding instead that the regula-
tions in question violated equal protection standards since the classifi-
cations embodied in them were "either counterproductive or irration-
ally overinclusive .... "8 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Black discussed both the due process 
and equal protection theories, noting that the latter had been the basis 
of decision in "[n]early all the opinions of State and lower Federal 
courts considering this question and finding similar rules unconstitu-
tional .... "9 The Court did not expressly favor either theory, hold-
ing: 
Whichever may be the sounder ground of constitutional decision, 
there can now be little doubt that the rule of the Malden school 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 637, 310 N.E.2d 330. Black was decided with a companion 
case, Lane v. School Comm. of Malden. The relevant Malden regulations provided: 
a. No married woman employee of the Public School shall be permitted to teach 
or perform her duties after the end of the fourth month of pregnancy but must 
resign from her position. 
b. Any employee who has had to resign for maternity reasons may be eligible for 
reinstatement six months after the date of birth of the child .... 
Id. at 639 n.3, 310 N.E.2d at 333 n.3. 
3 414 U.S. 632 (1974). LaFleur was decided with a companion case, Cohen v. Chester-
field County School Bd. 
4 417 u.s. 484 (1974). 
5 
" '(P]ermanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'" 414 U.S. at 644, quoting 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
654 (1972). 
6 The Cleveland rule in LaFleur required termination not less than five months be-
fore the expected date of birth; the Chesterfield County rule required termination at 
least four months prior to the expected date of birth. 414 U.S. at 635 n.1, 637 n.5. The 
Supreme Court left open the question whether maternity leave regulations requiring 
termination at a firm date during the last weeks of pregnancy might be justified. Id. at 
647 n.13. 
7 Only the Cleveland rule was invalidated. The Chesterfield County rule had no such 
arbitrary waiting period; it simply required submission of a medical certificate from the 
teacher's physician. 414 U.S. at 650. 
8 414 U.S. at 653 (concurring opinion). 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 648, 310 N.E.2d at 338. 
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committee must be held invalid at both ends-in its provision for 
mandatory "resignation" by the fourth month of pregnancy, and 
in its provision for a six-month waiting period after birth before 
reinstatement is possible. 10 
The Supreme Judicial Court went beyond LaFleur, however, in 
holding that a teacher absent from work because of pregnancy-related 
disabilities could not be accorded different rights tf. sick pay than a 
teacher suffering from other temporary physical ~isabilities. 11 The 
Court found such a distinction to be "arbitrary andbunconstitutional, 
whether or not one relates it to discrimination bas d exclusively on 
sex" and an invidious classification since it placed a burden on the 
"fundamental freedom of choice in marriage and family life."12 The 
Court expressly noted, however, that it was not "intimating that no 
State interests can ever conceivably be asserted to justify particular 
distinctions for purposes of sick leave between pregnancy and other 
disabilities. "13 i 
Following the decision in Black, the United Stateb Supreme Court 
held in Geduldig v. Aiello 14 that disability insurance I benefits were in-
terests of such a nature. The Court held valid a C~lifornia disability 
insurance program that excluded from its definiti~m of "disability" 
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy. 15 Emphasizing the lim-
ited nature of disabling conditions compensable under the 
program, 16 the Court noted that "consistently with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, a State 'may take one step at a time, addressing itself to 
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative 
mind ... ,' "17 without a court imposing its judgment as to the appro-
priate stopping point as long as the line drawn by th1 state is rationally 
supportable. 18 Thus the Supreme Court found that Ixclusion of preg-
nancy from compensable disabilities was not a gender-based 
discrimination; 19 the state's interests in managing a !elf-supporting in-
'" Id. 
11 Id. at 649-50, 310 N.E.2d at 338-39. 
12 Id., 310 N.E.2d at 339. Although the Supreme Judicial Court found the classifica-
tion to be invidious since it placed a burden on a fundamental freedom, equal protec-
tion strict scrutiny may be based either on invidious classification or on burdensome ef-
fect on a fundamental interest. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. I (1972); Developmeryts in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969). 1 
13 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 650, 310 N.E.2d at 339. , 
14 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
15 Id. at 486. 
16 Id. at 488-89. 
17 Id. at 495. 
IH Id. 
'" Id. at 496 n.20. 
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surance program which would not unduly burden partiCipating em-
ployees were legitimate, and the exclusion of pregnancy from com-
pensable disabilities was rationally related to such interests. 20 
The United States Supreme Court has thus far avoided definitive 
resolution of the standard of review applicable to sex discrimination 
cases. The Court has not declared gender to be a suspect 
classification.21 Nevertheless, in invalidating programs while conceding 
the legitimacy of state objectives and a rational connection to such ob-
jectives, the Court has often appeared to apply a standard of scrutiny 
more strict than the deference of traditional equal protection22 or to 
employ the irrebuttable presumption doctrine as an adaption of the 
rigorous equal protection scrutiny. 23 
The decision in Black confirms the principle, effected prior to 1974 
through administrative regulations of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission24 and the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination, 25 that maternity leave must be treated similarly as 
leave for any other temporary disability. The uncertainty of the stan-
dard of review applied in gender discrimination cases by the United 
States Supreme Court, however, has made it more difficult for state 
courts to know which standard of review to apply. After Aiello, for ex-
ample, there is a serious question of whether the Supreme Judicial 
Court's holding in Black with respect to sick pay remains good law. If, 
as the Supreme Court held in Aiello, no unconstitutional gender-based 
discrimination resulted from California's exclusion of pregnancy from 
disability benefits, why should any such discrimination result from a 
similar exclusion in Malden's sick leave rules? Possible justification for 
sustaining this aspect of the Black holding, even after Aiello, is that the 
Malden sick leave rules contained none of the types of explicit limita-
tions on eligibility for benefits contained in the California program; 
thus there was no rational justification for excluding pregnancy under 
the Malden rules. Aiello also involved a delimited insurance fund in 
which the state had interests, not applicable to the sick leave limitation 
20 Id. at 496. 
21 But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-86 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
22 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971). 
23 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J., con-
curring). 
24 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1974), promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e-2000e(l5) (1974), as made applicable to state agencies and educational institu-
tions by Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. I 03 (March 24, 1972). 
25 Regulations promulgated in 1973 by the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination pursuant to G.L. c. 149, § 105D; c. !51 B, § 4, as inserted by Acts of 1972, 
c. 790. 
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of Black, that the employee contributions not be raised, that benefits 
not be trivialized, and that the specific program remain self-
supporting. Although providing sick leave benefits to pregnant 
teachers is costly to a school system, such generalized fiscal concern is 
not sufficient state interest to exclude pregnancy. 
§20.10. Teacher personnel administration: Proc~dural safeguards 
for tenured teachers. In Black v. School Committ~e of Malden, 1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the school comfi1ittee's unilateral 
terminations of employment of two pregnant, tenured teachers were 
not acts of "dismissal" within section 42 of chapter r 1 of the General 
Laws and thus did not require notice, hearing, and other procedural 
safeguards of that statute. 2 The Court found that the terminations 
were "forced resignations," a "final though belated decision by the 
school committee" to enforce its mandatory maternity leave rule 
which included a reinstatement provision. 3 
In holding that section 42 was inapplicable, the . Court also noted 
that the terminated teachers did not claim that the ~chool committee's 
acts were "suspensions" within section 42D of chapt~r 71 of the Gen-
eral Laws, which also provides for notice, hearing and other pro-
cedural safeguards. 4 Without the protection of sect~ on 42, the Court 
recognized that the teachers would have to wait fori reinstatement for 
six months or longer after childbirth and would ndt have the oppor-
tunity for a hearing in which they could have argued for a revision of 
the rule. 5 
If the contention that "terminations" with eligibility for reinstate-
ment were "suspensions" had been properly advanced and rejected, a 
category of "forced resignations" would have been created which 
would eliminate the necessity for suspension of an I employee for not 
complying with a regulation requiring resignation or leave of absence. 
Since the impact of forced resignation would seem ~o be as adverse as 
that of suspension, it would be anomalous i~ the procedural 
safeguards applicable to dismissal or suspension wete not available to 
individuals in the position of plaintiffs in Black. 1 However, future 
plaintiffs may successfully contend that "forced resignations" are 
"suspensions" within section 42D, or at least that they have a due pro-
cess right to some kind of hearing. 6 
§20.10. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 637, 310 N.E.2d 330. For a disqussion of the constitu-
tional issues raised in Black, see § 20.9 supra. i 
2 197 4 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 643-44, 310 N .E.2d at 335-36. 
3 ld. at 643, 310 N.E.2d at 335. See§ 20.7 n.2 supra. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 645 n.12, 310 N.E.2d at 336 n.l2. 
5 Id. at 644-45, 310 N.E.2d at 336. 
6 Although the plaintiffs in Black failed to do so, the Court i~ferentially pointed out 
that plaintiffs could assert constitutional rights of hearings if thejr pleadings included a 
statement of the requisite interest to invoke procedural due process protection. Id. at 
645 n.12, 310 N.E.2d at 336 n.12, citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
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§20.11. Teacher personnel administration: Dismissal. In Wishart 
v. McDonald,! the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
held: (1) a dismissed tenured sixth-grade teacher was not required to 
exhaust state remedies2 before coming into federal court alleging de-
privation of constitutional rights; 3 (2) a dismissal of a teacher for car-
rying, in public view on his property located in the town where he 
taught, in a lewd and suggestive manner, a dress mannequin that he 
had dressed, undressed and caressed, was not arbitrary or capricious; 4 
and (3) the statutory standard of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" was 
not unconstitutionally vague. 5 
The significance of Wishart lies in the great deference the court was 
willing to accord the school committee's decision that a teacher's con-
duct which occurred outside the school environment on his private 
property was sufficiently job-related to justify their action of dismissal. 
In finding that the dismissal was not arbitrary or capricious, the court 
stated that although the view that the conduct "would destroy [the 
teacher's] ability to serve as a role-model for young children"6 may be 
overly strict, it is just such a judgment that a school committee is 
elected to make and should prevail unless plainly wrong. 7 Further, the 
statutory standard of "conduct unbecoming a teacher" applied by the 
school committee was not vague as to plaintiff since his behavior "was 
sufficiently odd and suggestive that the ordinary person would know, 
in advance, that his image as an elementary school teacher would be 
408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972) ("liberty" and "property" interests of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment include "the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and gener-
ally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men," quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S: 390, 399 (1923) ), and 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (professor whose contract was not renewed 
was entitled to procedural due process protection, including hearing and notice of 
grounds of his nonretention, if college had a de facto tenure program and professor 
had tenure under that program). 
§20.11. 1 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 530 (D. Mass. 1973). 
2 A tenured teacher dismissed under G.L. c. 71, § 42, is entitled to a de novo hearing 
in superior court and the right of appeal. G.L. c. 71, § 43A. 
3 500 F.2d at 1114-15. 
4 Id. at 1115-16. The court applied the three-pronged analysis established in Drown 
v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1105 (1st Cir. 1971) (dismissal could be "arbitrary 
and capricious" if reason were "trivial," if "wholly unsupported by facts," or if "unre-
lated to the educational process or to [the] working relationships within the educational 
institution"). 
5 500 F.2d at 1116. The court found the vagueness challenge foreclosed by Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (standard for federal employees of "such cause as will 
promote the efficiency of the service" held not unconstitutionally vague). 
6 500 F.2d at 1115. 
7 Id. at 1116. 
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gravely jeopardized."8 The court stated that if the cause for dismissal 
were speech or some other constitutionally protected activity, its con-
clusions as to arbitrariness of dismissal and vaguqness of standard 
would have been different. 9 i 
§20.12 School governance: Boston School Com~ittee discretion 
as to budgetary decision. The Supreme Judicial Court in Pirrone v. 
City of Boston 1 held that a statutory "ten taxpayer bill,"2 brought to ob-
tain a determination that insufficient funds had ~en appropriated 
for the support of public schools, could not be mai tained against the 
city of Boston. 3 The Court found that such a suit w uld be irreconcil-
able with the comprehensive statutory system applicable to school fi-
nances in Boston limiting the budgetary autonomy of the Boston 
School Committee. 4 The Court found it clear that the legislature "in-
tended that the Boston school committee should h~ve less budgetary 
autonomy than school committees in other Massa~husetts cities and 
towns."5 I 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 1116 & n.5. 
§20.12. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1565,305 N.E.2d 96. 
2 G.L. c. 71, § 34 provides in pertinent part: 
Upon petition to the Superior Court ... against a city or town, brought by ten or 
more taxable inhabitants thereof, ... alleging that the amount necessary ... for 
the support of public schools ... has not been included in the annual budget ap-
propriations ... , said court may determine the amount of th~ deficiency, if any, 
and may order such city ... to provide a sum of money equa' to such deficiency, 
together with a sum equal to twenty-five percent thereof. i 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1575, 305 N.E.2d at 103. 1 
4 ld. The statute currently applicable cited by the Court is Acts of 1936, c. 224, as 
amended. 
5 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1574, 305 N.E.2d at 102. Unlike other cities and towns 
within the Commonwealth, which are required by G.L. c. 71, § 3J to appropriate all the 
funds requested by their school committees for necessary schoo purposes, the Boston 
School Committee's school expenditures are limited by fixed dol ar amounts which can 
be increased only after request by the school committee to the mayor, recommendation 
by the mayor to the city council, and approval by the city council, subject to the mayor's 
veto. 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1571-74,305 N.E.2d at 101-03. 
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